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Brittain v. U.S. Lines (Cont.) 
ANALYSIS: The Second Circuit rejected the seamen's first 
contention that the banks somehow precipitated the arrest of the 
vessels in a jurisdiction where their liens would have priority 
over the seamen's liens observing that there was no factual 
proof to support this allegation. The court then declared that the 
seamen could not challenge the validity of the July 27 order on 
the grounds that they did not receive notice of the request for its 
entry. The court observed that even if the seamen were entitled 
to notice, their lack of notice did not result in any adverse 
consequences and therefore they could not object to the order on 
this grounds. See In re Photo Promotion Associate, Inc., 53 
Bankr. 759 <S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
Additionally, the seamen could not object to the order which 
permitted the parties to pursue their claims in the Singapore 
proceeding, since the seamen would not have been obliged to 
enforce their liens in the Singapore action had there not been a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Furthermore, the seamen had no 
grounds to object to the post-petition financing promised by the 
banks, since the banks' liens, even prior to the order which 
approved post-petition financing, far exceeded the amount of 
money derived from the sale of the ships. The court emphatically 
acknowledged that the seamen should be "distressed that Sin­
gapore law accords the banks' lien a priority higher than their 
own, whereas the reverse situation would have applied ... lin a! 
Bankruptcy Court," but noted that this court was in no position to 
remedy this inequity since the law of the forum administering 
the res governs the priority of the liens. See Gulf Oil Trading Co. 
v. Creole Supply, 596 F.2d 515, 521 <2d Cir. 1979>. 
Peter M. Corri gan '90 
MILES v. MELROSE 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 11 September 1989 
88 2 F.2d 976 
A uni on has a duty under the general maritime law to warn a shipowner or operator with whom it has a collective 
bargai ning agreement of the k nown propensities of a member sent to work on the vessel. 
FACTS: On July 5, 1984, Clifford Melrose was sent by his 
union to join the crew of the M/V Archon, replacing another cook 
in a three man galley. The seamen servmg on Archon were 
hired pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. On July 
18, 1984, Melrose provoked an argument with James Jackson, 
the chief steward/baker. Jackson believed Melrose to be under 
the influence of alcohol, hostile and angry. Shortly after this 
confrontation, Jackson went to Ludwick Torregano's cabin. Tor­
regano was the assistant steward and the third man in the 
galley. Jackson found Torregano dead. 
The coroner's report indicated that Torregano had been stabbed 
or cut at least 62 times. Jackson testified at Melrose's murder 
trial that after discovering the body, he saw Melrose standing 
naked and wet with a blood stained towel wrapped around his 
arm. Melrose's blood alcohol level was .19lk. Melrose was convicted 
of second degree murder. 
Mercedel Miles, Torregano's mother and administratrix of his 
estate, asserted that she is entitled to damages as a result of the 
vessel's unseaworthiness under general maritime law and for 
negligence under the Jones Act 46 U.S.C.A. §688. The shipowners 
sought indemnity from the union for the union's failure to warn 
the shipowners of Melrose's violent propensities. 
The district court dismisse� the defendant's third party comp­
lamt agamst the umon for failure to state a claim. 
ISSUES: ( 1) Was the MIV Archon rendered unseaworthy as a 
matter of law due to the unfittness of Melrose? 
( 2) Does a union have a duty under general maritime 
law to warn a shipowner or operator with whom it has a collective 
bargaining agreement of the known violent propensities of a 
member sent to work on the vessel? 
ANALYSIS: In order to find a vessel unseaworthy, a plaintitl 
must prove that a crew member was "not equal in disposition 
and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling." Clevenger 
v. Star Fish and Oyster Co., Inc., 325 F.2d 397, 402 <5th Cir. 
1963>. General maritime law requires an absolute duty of the 
shipowner to provide the members of the crew with a seaworthy 
vessel. Not only will a damaged hull render a ship unseaworthy, 
but so will a seaman not reasonably fit. While this standard 
requires a fact-specific inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has previously 
held that where an assault is extremely violent, this in and of 
itself can be sufficient evidence that the assailant is not equal in 
disposition and seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling. 
Clevenger, supra. 
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Under the facts of the case at bar, the coroner's report stated 
that the victim had suffered 62 stabbings or cuts. There was no 
evidence to contradict the coroner's analysis of the savagery of 
the attack thereby confirming Melrose's extremely violent dis­
position. Melrose failed to measure up to the standard of this 
calling and the Fifth Circuit held that the vessel was thereby 
rendered unseaworthy as a matter of law. 
As to the issue of indemnification, the court.stated that in order 
to decide whether the claim for indemnification from the union 
for the tort claim of failure of duty to warn, is cognizable, the 
court must assume that the alleged negligence can be proved -
that the union knew a worker had a violent propensity, that the 
union could foresee that he might injure the other crew members 
and that the union's failure to warn the shipowner was in fact 
the legal cause of the injury. 
In order to determine whether the union owes a duty to warn 
the shipowner of the violent propensities of a referred member, 
the court noted §314 of the Restatement of Torts <Second> that 
provides that where a force is within the actor's control, his 
failure to control it is treated as though he were actively directing 
it. Thus, by referring Melrose when it knew that he was dangerous, 
the union was no longer a mere bystander, but rather was in 
control of the process that presented the evil. The shipowner is 
dependent on the union contractually for its workers and the 
union is in a unique position to prevent the harm. 
The court noted that where two parties stand in a relationship 
of dependence, the law may impose a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to protect the dependent party from injury. To allow the 
union to refer a seaman known to have violent propensities and 
fail to warn the shipowner would contravene maritime law 
principles. The seaman's safety can best be promoted by" 'plac­
lingJ liability on the party who was truly at fault and who 
should mend his negligent ways to prevent further injury.' " 
Flunker v. United States, 528 F.2d 239, 243 <9th Cir. 1975). The 
court stressed that the owner/operator still warrants the vessel's 
seawor�hines�. The union is not charged with any warranties as 
to the disposi twns of the crew or an independent duty to investi­
gate If a member IS vwlent, but rather is only required to 
exercise ordinary care when it knows that a worker is likely to 
harm other crew members. The court reversed the district 
court's dismissal of the third party complaint and reinstated the 
shipowner's claim for indemnification or contribution. 
Jules F. V allay '90 
